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Leszek Drong
Theory’s Other: Reintegrating the New Pragmatism 
into Literary Studies
The reasons for cherishing a particular academic text of one’s own making are 
usually connected with its value and role as a crowning achievement of one’s 
intellectual efforts. In my case, however, the essay reprinted below was more of 
a new begining than a terminus of an arduous journey. Above all else, it marked 
a momentous shift in my perspective on my professional commitments and priori‑
ties. Thereby, it carried significant personal and emotional overtones as well. Today 
I see it as a blueprint for what turned out to be an absorbing research interest which 
has continued to inspire and sustain me in my academic peregrinations ever since. 
Written in 2002, “Theory’s Other” was the first attempt to define my position on the 
New Pragmatism in literary studies. As such, it laid the foundations for what was to 
become a booklength project completed in collaboration with several prominent 
American scholars including Stanley Fish, Walter Benn Michaels and Gerald Graff. 
Subsequently, selected sections of this essay were incorporated into my 2007 book 
titled Disciplining the New Pragmatism: Theory, Rhetoric, and the Ends of Literary 
Study.
In the early 1980’s a juicy scandal erupted in connection with a controversial liai‑
son between critical practice and literary theory. Their tempestuous relationship 
became an object of critical scrutiny on the part of Walter Benn Michaels and Steven 
Knapp, whose essay “Against Theory” is a testimony to their unprecedented mistrust 
of any kind of meta ‑practice. In what follows I propose to interrogate both parties, 
i.e. those who defend the claims of theory and those who want to do away with it 
altogether. The latter group is often associated with the New Pragmatism whose 
origins and precepts I will discuss further on in this essay. Eventually, a pragmatist 
critical perspective will be brought to bear on both positions to demonstrate their 
respective advantages and disadvantages.
If theory may be charged with metapractical pretensions, a position which lays 
claim to a critical distance on theory itself may be suspected of metatheoretical 
ones. Therefore it must be stressed that my remarks on theory and its discontents 
will be made from within the enterprise and will never aspire to a metatheoreti‑
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cal status. One of the basic themes of any version of pragmatism is its insistence 
on the inescapable situatedness of our opinions. Mine will also come from 
a particular position, circumscribed by a set of beliefs and preconceptions that 
none of us can possibly transcend altogether. Rather than erect binary opposi‑
tions between theory and its New Pragmatist critique, I will seek to reintegrate the 
latter into the former and redescribe the New Pragmatism as theory’s interiorised 
other.
The tendency to reconcile apparent antagonisms is what seems to have inspired 
Knapp and Michaels in the first place. Their vociferous pronouncements against 
theory rest on the contention that theory flourishes by positing divisions and 
separations where there are none. Their essay is a tour de force not because it 
provides a key to all the hitherto unsolved theoretical problems but because it 
reduces them all to a couple of rudimentary propositions concerning the issues of 
belief and intention. More than that, “Against Theory” ensures its own effective‑
ness as a critique of theory by assigning an unequivocal definition to this highly 
ambivalent concept, whose identification is Knapp and Michaels’s preliminary, and 
strategically inestimable, step to its subsequent demolition. That in the long run 
their blows strike empty air is another corollary of their own argument: Knapp 
and Michaels first declare war against theory only to acknowledge that theory as 
they define it (for the purpose of their own critique) does not and cannot exist. If 
indeed, as they insist, “no one can reach a position outside practice,”1 why go to 
such lengths to nip in the bud the aspirations of theorists who want to institute 
a metapractical agenda?
Let us retrace their argument step by step. What Knapp and Michaels are 
up to is aptly conveyed by the title of their essay. At its outset they qualify their 
attack by narrowing down the definition of theory to “a special project in liter‑
ary criticism: the attempt to govern interpretations of particular texts by appeal‑
ing to an account of interpretation in general.”2 Thus they leave aside vast areas 
of literary studies such as narratology, stylistics, and prosody, which they deem 
“essentially empirical”3 rather than theoretical. Having staked out the territory 
that their opponent is authorised to occupy, they launch a full ‑scale offensive. 
Again, they claim the right to choose the weapon: they take up two exemplary 
concerns — intention and belief — to demonstrate their utterly unproblematical 
status and accordingly pull the carpet from under the feet of those who might 
still be inclined to spin theoretical yarns about those two notions. In short, their 
examples “are meant to represent the central mechanism of all theoretical argu‑
ments, and [their] treatment of them is meant to indicate that all such arguments 
1 Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels: “Against Theory,” in: William J. Thomas Mitchell, 
ed., Against Theory: Literary Studies and the New Pragmatism (Chicago and London: The Univer‑
sity of Chicago Press, 1985), 30.
2 Knapp and Michaels, “Against Theory,” 11.
3 Knapp and Michaels, “Against Theory,” 11.
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will fail and fail in the same way.”4 Knapp and Michaels’s argument, in turn, will 
prevail solely by virtue of its unassailable reductionism and plain commonsen‑
sicality.5
Of the two substantial arguments against theory that Knapp and Michaels put 
forward, the one which identifies text’s meaning with author’s intention deserves 
particular consideration. In the second section of their essay, Knapp and Michaels 
take E.D. Hirsch, Jr. — an exemplary intentionalist in their view — to task for 
implicitly positing a moment of interpretation before intention is present.6 But in 
fact their own conclusions beg their question, inasmuch as what they assume to 
be evidence of the impossibility of meaning without intention boils down to an 
illustration of “how difficult it is to imagine a case of intentionless meaning.”7 They 
use their demonstration very much like a weapon which has already been tested in 
battle and proved efficacious in slaying the dragon of theory whereas the point is 
still a contestable one, as Jonathan Crewe points out in his response to Knapp and 
Michaels’s essay.8
This is particularly conspicuous in their assault on Hirsch’s distinction between 
‘the author’s meaning’ and ‘the reader’s meaning.’ Whilst many literary critics 
would certainly subscribe to the claim about meaning and intention being insepa‑
rable, few will be naive enough to attach any practical significance to the intended 
meaning that the empirical author infused into her/his text. Hirsch stresses that 
we must carefully distinguish between “what the author intended” and “what the 
author intends,”9 a distinction which involves two different intentional agents. 
And though I believe that Knapp and Michaels are right to argue that we cannot 
construe meaning without assigning intention, I cannot understand why they 
turn a blind eye to the uselessness of identifying meaning with what the actual 
composer of the text might have intended. In their attempt to outrun theory they 
reach a dead end rather than a practical resolution of the problem: their insistence 
that “the object of all reading is always the historical author’s intention”10 is not 
only indicative of their utopian nostalgy for the good old days before theory but 
it fails to provide a workable strategy for the critic as well. Are we to divine the 
meaning of a text inspired by some higher spiritual afflatus, in an act of mental 
communion with the long departed author? Or shall we fall back on guesswork 
and bare speculation? Surely, sober pragmatists that they aspire to be would not 
 4 Knapp and Michaels, “Against Theory,” 12.
 5 For an inciting discussion of the traps and temptations that inhere in being common ‑sensical 
see Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 
74—75.
 6 See Knapp and Michaels, “Against Theory,” 13—15.
 7 Knapp and Michaels, “Against Theory,” 15.
 8 See Jonathan Crewe, “Toward Uncritical Practice,” in: Mitchell, ed., Against Theory, 62.
 9 See E.D. Hirsch, Jr., “Against Theory?” in: Mitchell, ed., Against Theory, 50.
10 Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels, “Reply to Our Critics,” in: Mitchell, ed., Against 
Theory, 103.
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recommend that we distill the composer’s intention from the intrinsic qualities 
of the text?11
Clearly, given their position on authorial intention, Knapp and Michaels are 
left with two options. Either, in the absence of any verifiable information about 
the empirical author’s intention, they must postulate meaningless texts and thus 
at one fell swoop render pointless not only theory but intepretive practice as well, 
or they must subscribe to a version of ‘strong’ intentionalism which is essentialist 
at bottom and cannot possibly be squared with their avowedly pragmatist convic‑
tions. ‘Strong’ intentionalism assumes that the author impregnates her/his work 
with her/his intention which is preserved in the form a signus Dei in the text itself. 
Accordingly, the reader must be able to decode a secret message which lies hid‑
den at the heart of each work and constitutes its unique essence. Needless to say, 
this conception is anathema to every orthodox pragmatist because “[p]ragmatists 
are supposed to treat everything as a matter of a choice of context and nothing as 
a matter of intrinsic properties. They dissolve objects into functions, essences into 
momentary foci of attention, and knowing into success at reweaving a web of beliefs 
and desires into more supple and elegant folds.”12 All things considered, the essen‑
tialist implications of Knapp and Michaels’s argument about intention — undesir‑
able as they must be for their authors — testify to their confusion about the vantage 
point from which to attack theory. Those implications might also give evidence of 
the inevitable entrappment of each antitheoretical stance within the confines of the 
discourse of theory.
Moreover, Knapp and Michaels’s intentional reductionism leads to confusion 
for purely logical reasons. The confusion results from an all ‑too ‑smooth transition 
from epistemology to ontology. When they argue that meaning and the historical 
author’s intention are inseparable, they act upon their own contention that “the 
object of interpretation is always a historical intention.”13 And though it may be true 
that “[a]ny interpreter of any utterance or text, within the institution of professional 
literary criticism or not, is … attempting to understand the author’s intention,”14 
their conclusion that “texts mean what their authors intend”15 is not a conclusion 
at all. First of all, from the fact that we attempt to understand a text’s meaning, it 
does not follow that we can do so, at least not in the sense that the text is possessed 
of the meaning. Secondly, when we try to understand a text’s meaning, we indeed 
do so firmly convinced that we are divining the empirical author’s intention but 
in practice our divining comes down to imagining into being an intentional agent, 
11 Curiously, Knapp and Michaels recognise “the empirical difficulty of deciding what [a text’s] 
author intended” but they fail to draw practical conclusions from that difficulty. See Steven Knapp 
and Walter Benn Michaels, “Reply to Rorty,” in: Mitchell, ed., Against Theory, 142.
12 Richard Rorty, “Philosophy without Principles,” in: Mitchell, ed., Against Theory, 135.
13 Knapp and Michaels, “Reply to Our Critics,” 104.
14 Knapp and Michaels, “Reply to Our Critics,” 105.
15 Knapp and Michaels, “Reply to Our Critics,” 105.
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what Michel Foucault calls the author ‑function,16 who/which is our interpretive 
construct rather than a historical individual. To grasp that, one does not even need 
a theoretical argument: what we do as readers is an emipirical fact which is borne 
out by our interpretive practice.
What is particularly striking about Knapp and Michaels’s essay is not their 
dogged persistence in defying theory but the procedure they use to drive their mes‑
sage home. Their assault on theory constitutes a theoretical moment per se.17 For 
one, they cannot help relying on the discourse they want to transcend: the frame‑
work of their essay and its rhetoric are borrowed from what they seek to discredit. 
Of theoretical significance are also the conclusions that Knapp and Michaels urge 
their readers to draw. If there are any practical consequences that might follow 
from their propositions, they will be largely relevant to theory itself and to all those 
working within the enterprise. It goes without saying that they will not be sympa‑
thetic to the New Pragmatists’ appeal for ceasing all theoretical activity. Thus it is 
likely that Knapp and Michaels’s will prove to be a vacuous gesture, with no practi‑
cal effect on what they are out to annihilate. They seem to anticipate as much when 
they conclude their essay by diminishing their opponent in the following words: 
“theory is nothing else but the attempt to escape practice.”18 Wouldn’t it be easier 
(and more consistent) then to demonstrate that by busying oneself with critical 
practice rather than theory?
Although it might appear otherwise, what I have discussed up to this point is 
not meant to undermine the critical standpoint that Knapp and Michaels choose 
for their anti ‑theoretical manifesto. On the contrary, I believe that their pragmatist 
approach is one of the most invigorating elements in current theoretical debates. It 
is just that I find the arrows of their arguments pointed in a wrong direction: they 
seem to have miscalculated the purpose of their attack on theory. From a pragmat‑
ist perspective their essay misses the target that it was supposed to hit though it 
has certainly produced important side ‑effects. One of those (possibly undesirable) 
side ‑effects involves the consolidation in the camp of all the conservative theorists 
who might have felt threatened by the rhetorical bravado with which Knapp and 
Michaels set about dismantling the pillars of theory. Another side ‑effect is con‑
nected with the opportunity to calibrate the pragmatists’ gunsights afforded by 
their essay’s shortcomings. Historically, “Against Theory” was no doubt a pioneer‑
ing endeavour to bring a pragmatist mode of thinking to bear on literary studies.19
16 See Michel Foucalt, “What Is an Author?” in: Seán Burke, ed., Authorship: From Plato to the 
Post ‑modern (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1995), 233—246.
17 A similar point is made by Adena Rosmarin in her essay “Theory of <Against Theory>.” See 
Rosmarin, “Theory of »Against Theory«,” in: Mitchell, ed., Against Theory, 80—88.
18 Knapp and Michaels, “Against Theory,” 30.
19 It must be acknowledged that it was not the only endeavour of that kind made in the early 
1980’s. In 1980 Stanley Fish published his Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive 
Communities and in 1982 “What is the Meaning of a Text?,” an influential essay by Jeffrey Stout, 
came out in New Literary History. But neither Fish nor Stout declare their own position to be so 
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In fact, this critical position is rooted in a philosophical tradition of over a cen‑
tury’s standing. Whatever they say about theory and practice, Knapp and Michaels 
bank on the cornerstones of pragmatism erected by its progenitors — Charles Sand‑
ers Peirce, John Dewey and William James. Those cornerstones include, among oth‑
ers, anti ‑foundationalism, anti ‑essentialism, anti ‑representationalism and fallibi‑
lism.20 A thorough discussion of their origins and development within pragmatism 
goes well outside the scope of this essay but I would like to give a brief characterisa‑
tion of the pragmatist understanding of their implications in the context of truth, 
which has always been one of pragmatism’s central concerns.21
Anti ‑foundationalism and fallibilism are clearly promulgated by Peirce in his 
attack on scholasticism in philosophy. Peirce is quite skeptical about the Cartesian 
project of establishing the ultimate test of certainty (which, according to Descartes, 
was to be found in the cogito, the individual consciousness) but he maintains that 
we cannot put into doubt everything at once: “We must begin with all the prejudices 
which we actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy. These preju‑
dices are not to be dispelled by a maxim, for they are things which it does not occur 
to us can be questioned.”22 Nevertheless, they are prejudices rather than certitudes 
in the absolute sense and that insight does credit to pragmatists, who, unlike the 
scholastically ‑minded philosophers, are capable of allowing for their own fallibility.
In “The Fixation of Belief,” a momentous essay which Peirce delivered to the 
Metaphysical Club at Cambridge in 1877, he explores how we come to acquire 
beliefs which guide our desires and shape our actions. Of the four methods of fix‑
ing belief — the method of tenacity, the method of authority, the a priori method 
and the method of science — Peirce privileges the last one because only the method 
of science may ensure that man’s opinions coincide with the facts. It is only by the 
method of science that we can get to know truth “which is distinguished from false‑
hood simply by this, that if acted on it will carry us to the point we aim at and not 
overtly pragmatist. Besides, unlike Knapp and Michaels’, their texts do not bear the qualities of 
a critical creed.
20 In his essay “Pragmatism, Pluralism, and the Healing of Wounds,” Richard J. Bernstein 
lists as constitutive themes of the pragmatic ēthos anti ‑foundationalism, fallibilism, pluralism, the 
social character of the self and the need to nurture a criticial community of inquirers as well as the 
awareness and sensitivity to radical contingency and chance that mark the universe, our inquiries 
and our lives. For the purpose of my argument, which is principally concerned with the conjunc‑
tion of the New Pragmatism and Literary Studies, I have modified his list to bring out those themes 
which are particularly resonant in the context of contemporary critical theory and practice. See 
Richard J. Bernstein “Pragmatism, Pluralism, and the Healing of Wounds,” in: Louis Menand, ed., 
Pragmatism: A Reader (Vintage Books: New York, 1997), 385—389.
21 William James considers the concept of truth so important that he defines pragmatism itself 
as “a genetic theory of what is meant by truth.” William James, Pragmatism (New York: Dover Pub‑
lications, 1995), 26.
22 Charles Sanders Peirce, “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities,” in: Menand, ed., Prag‑
matism, 4—5.
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astray.”23 Again, Peirce’s point is not that the method of science should provide us 
with ‘objective knowledge’ of the world. Instead, he can envisage substantial prac‑
tical advantages of holding beliefs acquired by that particular method. Clearly, 
the principal advantage is that such beliefs help us act effectively, that is, they are 
instrumental in our day ‑to ‑day dealing with our environment. This is not neces‑
sarily to say, however, that those beliefs are in any sense ‘truer’ to what this envi‑
ronment is in itself.
Equally critical of the scholastic methodology is John Dewey. In his “Theories 
of Knowledge” he takes scholasticism to task for propounding “a form of knowing 
which has no especial connection with any particular subject matter. It includes 
making distinctions, definitions, divisions, and classifications for the mere sake of 
making them — with no objective in experience.”24 Clearly, the scholastic method 
stands here for what Knapp and Michaels will identify as theory: it is a system of 
rules and principles that, by virtue of being abstracted from any specific context, 
are elevated to a higher epistemological status. Knowledge for Dewey, as well as 
for other pragmatists, can never be contextless. A problem is worth exploring if 
its solution makes a difference to how we see other problems or cope with other 
tasks, that is, if practical consequences follow from our exploration of it. As Peirce 
puts it, pragmatism, understood as “a certain maxim of logic,” was invented “to 
trace out in the imagination the conceivable practical consequences, — that is, 
the consequences for deliberate, self ‑controlled conduct, — of the affirmation or 
denial of [a] concept.”25 Therefore, pragmatism does not shun abstractions and 
generalisations.26 It is just that they must be subordinated to our specific goals 
and purposes rather than admired for their imperial insusceptibility to contex‑
tual applications.
This is exactly how William James approaches the concept of truth. In Prag‑
matism, his position on truth is at once anti ‑foundationalist, anti ‑essentialist and 
anti ‑representationalist. To begin with, James declares that purely objective truth 
is nowhere to be found because truth is what we make rather than discover.27 Thus 
truh is redefined as a dynamic property of an idea, as what happens to it in the 
process of its verification and validation.28 That paves the way for ‘the instrumental 
view of truth’ which James, relying on Dewey and Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller, 
describes in the following words:
23 Charles Sanders Peirce, “The Fixation of Belief,” in: Menand, ed., Pragmatism, 25.
24 John Dewey, “Theories of Knowledge,” in: Menand, ed., Pragmatism, 215.
25 Charles Sanders Peirce, “A Definition of Pragmatism,” in: Menand, ed., Pragmatism, 56.
26 See the following passage: “She [i.e. pragmatism] has no objection whatever to the realizing 
of abstractions, so long as you get about among particulars with their aid and they actually carry 
you somewhere.” James, Pragmatism, 29.
27 See James, Pragmatism, 25, 78 and 84.
28 See James, Pragmatism, 77—78.
210 Leszek Drong
Ideas (which themselves are but parts of experience) become true just 
in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts 
of our experience, to summarize them and get about among them by 
conceptual short ‑cuts instead of following the interminable succession 
of particular phenomena. Any idea upon which we can ride, so to speak; 
any idea that will carry us prosperously from any one part of our eperience 
to any other part, linking things satisfactorily, working securely, simplify‑
ing, saving labour; is true for just so much, true in so far forth, true instru‑
mentally.29
While essentialists tend to see truth as an immanent and immutable property 
of ideas, and representationalists stress the relation of correspondence between 
true ideas and whatever they stand for, James takes the true as merely “the expedi‑
ent in our way of thinking.”30 His insistence on the utility of truth(s) is of course 
very much against the grain of rationalist and idealist views of what truth ought
to be. But, at bottom, his position on the issue aptly illustrates pragmatism’s 
ambition to settle all those metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be inter‑
minable.31
For a sustained critique of foundationalism, representationalism and essential‑
ism, let us turn now to two contemporary avatars of pragmatism, whose views, far 
from making up a system, will furnish the basic parameters of the New Pragmatist 
stance on the relationship between theory and critical practice. Richard Rorty’s posi‑
tion on the issue is informed by his conviction that literary criticism has recently 
succumbed to “a desire to paint the great big picture.”32 This is due to a mistaken 
assumption that literary critics, in order to validate their endeavours, should seek 
help from philosophy.33 In consequence, as Rorty has it, they “take philosophy a bit 
too seriously.”34 Instead of focusing on small ‑scale jobs, literary critics ransack phi‑
losophy for ‘theories of meaning’ or ‘theories of the nature of interpretation.’ Again, 
Rorty deplores the literary theorists’ overabundant usage of the scientific rhetoric 
characteristic of the early period of analytic philosophy. Such a dalliance between 
29 James, Pragmatism, 23 (italics supplied by James).
30 James, Pragmatism, 86.
31 In the same context, Peirce does not mince his words and announces that the application of 
pragmatism to logic “speedily sweeps all metaphysical rubbish out of one’s own house. Each abstrac‑
tion is either pronounced to be gibberish or is provided with a plain, practical definition.” Peirce, 
“A Definition of Pragmatism,” 58.
32 Richard Rorty, “Texts and Lumps,” in: Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophi‑
cal Papers, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 78.
33 In Contingency, Irony, Solidarity, Rorty argues for reversing the vector of influences: he 
stipulates that literary critics be ‘moral advisors’ for ironists (i.e. a species of philosophers who are 
contrasted with metaphysicians) and instruct them in exercising the skill of synthesising. See Rorty, 
Contingency, Irony, Solidarity, 80—81.
34 Rorty, “Texts and Lumps,” 78.
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literary criticism and philosophy must be fruitless because philosophy too has failed 
to yield interesting results with regard to the relevant topics. Thus what Rorty finds 
particularly objectionable is an implicit way of instituting a hierarchy of the human 
sciences in which philosophy holds a privileged position vis ‑à ‑vis literary criticism.
This is not to say, however, that philosophy and literary studies have nothing 
in common. On the contrary, seen from a pragmatist perspective, both enterprises 
share a similar untheoretical, narrative style. According to Rorty, “telling stories 
about how one’s favorite and least favorite literary texts hang together is not to be 
distinguished from — is simply a species of — the »philosophical« enterprise of 
telling stories about the nature of the universe which highlight all the things one 
likes best and least.”35 Therefore he recommends that, rather than try to see the 
great big picture, critics have their favourite philosophers — favourites chosen by 
consonance with their own projects and arranged into a canon of their own mak‑
ing. Rorty suggests that they “neither be afraid of subjectivity nor anxious for meth‑
odology, but simply proceed to praise [their] heroes and damn [their] villains by 
making invidious comparisons.”36 Thus critics needn’t worry about demonstrating 
that their choices are underwritten by “antecedently plausible principles.”37 Though 
at first sight it looks like an invitation to interpretive anarchy,38 Rorty’s reassurance 
merely implies that critical practice does not have to presuppose any theoretical 
foundations.
And yet Rorty does not deliver his final blow and spares theory for pedagogic 
purposes. Of course theory will no longer be entitled to guide critical practice as its 
methodological foundation. Like Knapp and Michaels, Rorty stigmatises theory’s 
aspirations to a metapractical status but he appreciates its generalisations and defi‑
nitions for the purpose of summing up past achievements in the field of practice. 
On this view, theory follows practice and constitutes its rhetoric, a didactic instru‑
ment which may be useful in the lecture hall, rather than a set of dogmas to be fixed 
above the entrance to the academy. In this sense, Rorty does not lose sight of the 
practical consequences of theory’s existence. He can envisage an academic niche 
where theory will be harnessed to a pedagogic mission, and the mission may prove 
to be its redeeming feature.
35 Rorty, “Texts and Lumps,” 79.
36 Rorty, “Texts and Lumps,” 79.
37 Rorty, “Texts and Lumps,” 79.
38 That interpretive anarchy is not a viable alternative to principled criticism is aptly demon‑
strated by Stanley Fish, who argues that, though local and contextual, some interpretive constraints 
are always in place precisely because of the impossibility of transcending one’s situatedness and 
cultural assumptions. Accordingly, he claims that interpretation is itself “a structure of constraints, 
a structure which, because it is always and already in place, renders unavailable the independent 
or uninterpreted text and renders unimaginable the independent and freely interpreting reader.” 
Stanley Fish, “Working on the Chain Gang,” in: Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rheto‑
ric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 98. See 
also Fish, “Consequences,” in: Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally, 323.
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Much less sympathetic to the project and prospects of Literary Studies is Stanley 
Fish, another literary critic who declares that, on his agenda, practice holds prior‑
ity over theory. Fish’s views are in a sense symptomatic of the evolution of the New 
Pragmatist position within Literary Studies.39 His first critical contribution to pro‑
duce some resonance in the field was meant to break with the tyranny of the New 
Criticism which still reigned in the American academy in the early 1970’s. Fish’s 
conception of affective stylistics, which was first and foremost an attack on uncom‑
promising formalism of the New Critics, was largely appreciated for its champi‑
oning of the reader and her/his role in generating the meaning of the text. It was 
already in “Literature in the Reader” that Fish signed for the anti ‑essentialist camp,40 
although his account of the reading process was still vulnerable to some trenchant 
criticisms which concerned his failure to define the conventions that readers fol‑
low when they read as well as his insistence on reading sentences word by word in 
a temporal sequence.
Soon, however, Fish offered a rectified account (indeed, a theoretical model) of 
how we come to produce readings which evince intriguing convergencies and sur‑
prising differences. His concept of ‘interpretive communities’ proved to be the coup 
de grace to the hopes of all those who still believed that he would convert to a foun‑
dationalist creed. In “Interpreting the Variorum,” a text first published in Critical 
Inquiry in 1976, Fish recognises “the stability of interpretation among readers and the 
variety of interpretation in the career of a single reader.”41 Accordingly, he concedes 
the existence of something independent of and prior to individual interpretation. 
But his claim is that it is not to be sought in the intrinsic features of the text; rather, 
the stability and the variety are functions of interpretive strategies shared by those 
who make up interpretive communities. What is more, interpretive strategies, which 
allow us to differentiate between interpretive communities, do not come into force 
once we have read a book and are about to come up with an interpretation of it. They 
underlie the very production of texts. Within a community, authors and readers 
are bound by the same conventions, and that allows authors to produce what they 
might expect to be interpreted in the light of their intended strategies. Therefore it 
is particularly important to bear in mind that no interpretive strategies are imposed 
by the text because the text itself is a function of a set of strategies. We belong to 
interpretive communities even before we start reading or writing.
39 To the best of my knowledge, Fish has never refered to his own critical position as New 
Pragmatist but his avowed anti ‑foundationalism is one of the defining features of any brand of 
pragmatism.
40 See Stanley E. Fish, “Literature in the Reader: Affective Stylistics,” in: Jane P. Tompkins, ed.,
Reader ‑Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post ‑Structuralism (Baltimore and London: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 72, where he defines the meaning of a sentence in terms 
of an event involving the participation and contribution of the reader rather than the sentence’s 
immanent qualities alone.
41 Stanley Fish, “Interpreting the Variorum,” in: David Lodge, ed., Modern Criticism and The‑
ory: A Reader (New York: Longman, 1988), 325.
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This is not to say that our choice of the strategies must be made once and for 
good. Unlike fixed and immutable principles, interpretive strategies are volatile and 
flexible. And so are interpretive communities. Fish stresses their historicality but at 
the same time he acknowledges that, like any cultural assumptions we bring to bear 
on our interpretations, they appear to be incontestable and foundational. Again, 
this is tied up with his anti ‑essentialist position on meaning: “Meanings that seem 
perspicuous and literal are rendered so by forceful interpretive acts and not by the 
properties of language.”42 In other words, as long as we recognise the authority of 
a particular interpretive community — that is, as long as we believe in the founda‑
tional status of its interpretive strategies — we shall not be tempted to change our 
loyalties. Once we start entertaining doubts about its natural and universal sway 
over us, we are more and more likely to come under the influence of another one. 
There is no point, however, at which we can be ‘stateless’: belonging to some inter‑
pretive community means having beliefs and opinions, and thus it is an inelucta‑
ble aspect of our situatedness. As Fish puts it, “being situated not only means that 
one cannot achieve a distance on one’s beliefs, but that one’s beliefs do not relax 
their hold because one <knows> that they are local and not universal. This in turn 
means that even someone … who is firmly convinced of the circumstantiality of 
his convictions will nevertheless experience those convictions as universally, not 
locally, true.”43 By the same token, the anti ‑foundationalist project itself has to rest 
on some implicit ‘foundations’ — assumptions and beliefs that anti ‑foundationalists 
unflinchingly hold on to.
According to Fish, those beliefs should be carefully distinguished from a theo‑
ry.44 One of the principal contentions of declared anti ‑foundationalists is that their 
creed “really isn’t a theory at all; it is an argument against the possibility of theory.”45 
But when Fish argues that theory cannot possibly succeed because it is merely an 
extension of and an elaboration on practice, he seems to be oblivious of the recip‑
rocal nature of such relations. If indeed, by stressing the local, the historical, the 
contingent and the variable, anti ‑foundationalist thought offers us an account of 
how foundations emerge,46 it is an account which generates some imperatives for 
critical practice. Of course, one of the most uncompromising imperatives is that 
practice should liberate itself from the yoke of theory. In the long run, then, anti‑
42 Stanley Fish, “Introduction: Going Down the Anti ‑Formalist Road,” in: Fish, Doing What 
Comes Naturally, 9.
43 Stanley Fish, “Critical Self ‑Consciousness, Or Can We Know What We’re Doing?” in: Fish, 
Doing What Comes Naturally, 467.
44 Fish, like Knapp and Michaels, construes Theory as a set of principles, rules or procedures 
attached to no particular activity but thought of as a constraint on all fields of activity. See Fish, 
“Introduction: Going Down the Anti ‑Formalist Road,” 14.
45 Stanley Fish, “Consequences,” in: Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally, 322.
46 See Fish, “Introduction: Going Down the Anti ‑Formalist Road,” 26 and Stanley Fish, “Anti‑
 ‑Foundationalism, Theory Hope, and the Teaching of Composition,” in: Fish, Doing What Comes 
Naturally, 345.
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 ‑foundationalism cannot help functioning very much like the theory which it seeks 
to discredit. Fish might insist that his is a theoretical argument only in the sense 
of being involved in dismantling theory as such but, as I have demonstrated in the 
case of Knapp and Michaels’s essay, this argument is parasitical upon the discourse 
whose preservation is vital for the very practice of anti ‑foundationalism.
The question that pragmatists ask at this point is: ‘Why does an anti‑
 ‑foundationalist like Fish make such claims about theory and practice?’ What is 
Fish angling for when he encourages literary critics to abandon theory and devote 
themselves to ‘pure’ practice? An answer to this question is implied in his, as well as 
Knapp and Michaels’s, critique of theory’s metapractical pretensions. Fish wants us 
to see those pretensions in terms of a claim to institutional power: by elevating itself 
above practice, theory attempts to prescribe its procedures and mechanisms. In con‑
sequence, practitioners of literary criticism should take counsel from those who are 
possessed of some arcane knowledge about what interpretation is and how it is sup‑
posed to be carried out. As Fish puts it, “[i]nterpretation is not an abstract or con‑
textless process, but one that elaborates itself in the service of a specific enterprise.”47 
Therefore it is the degree of its influence on the shape of interpretive strategies that 
will determine the authority of the enterprise: “[…] interpetation is a  form of 
authority, since it is an extension of the prestige and power of an institution; and 
authority is a form of interpretation, since it is in its operations an application or 
“reading” of the principles embodied in that same institution.”48 Thus theory’s claim 
to a metapractical status must be seen in the light of its advocates’ will to power.
By contrast, the New Pragmatists are not only out to destabilise theory’s regime 
but they also try to efface their own subversive force. Stanley Fish repeatedly stresses 
that theoretical pronouncements can have no consequences for any field outside 
the enterprise itself. His ‘no ‑consequences’ argument is endorsed by Knapp and 
Michaels who seem to cast doubt even on the effectiveness of their own arguments 
against theory.49 If theory relies on a rhetoric of methodological superiority in rela‑
tion to practice, the New Pragmatism counters it with a rhetoric of self ‑effacement 
and renunciation of power.50 But this rhetoric should not obscure the fact that both 
parties are engaged in the same power game. Fish may be dismissive of the scope 
and far ‑reaching effects of exercising metapractical power within the academy and 
yet his anti ‑foundationalist position is a powerful bid for institutional authority.51 
It is not by accident that he has not published a single volume of practical criticism 
47 Stanley Fish, “Fish v. Fiss,” in: Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally, 135.
48 Fish, “Fish v. Fiss,” 135.
49 See Knapp and Michaels, “Reply to Our Critics,” 105.
50 See William J. Thomas Mitchell, “Introduction: Pragmatic Theory,” in: William J. Thomas 
Mitchell, ed., Against Theory: Literary Studies and the New Pragmatism (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1985), 4.
51 The irony of his position on the issue is that he has become one of the most influential and 
charismatic figures within, as well as outside, the American academy, with an exorbitant salary of 
230,000 $ as the Dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences in Chicago.
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for several decades now52; instead, he has furthered his career and professional stat‑
ure by excoriating theory and counselling others to focus on critical practice. As 
a result, his recriminations against theory might be construed as a way of generat‑
ing unflagging interest in what is at issue in the debate between pragmatists and 
theorists while, in the final analysis, their controversy may be seen as nothing else 
but a professional mystification.
All this is reminiscent of Fish’s own argument against anti ‑professionalism. Fish 
takes anti ‑professionalism to be an attempt to reach a metaprofessional perspective 
by identifying the limitations and dead ‑ends of self ‑centred professionalism. Anti‑
 ‑professionalism would thus offer a broader view of the profession and reinscribe it 
into a general picture of human activity and universal values. But on closer inspec‑
tion the sharp distinction between the two perspectives collapses:
As we have seen again and again, anti ‑professionalism is by and large a pro‑
test against those aspects of professionalism that constitute a threat to indi‑
vidual freedom, true merit, genuine authority. It is therefore the strong‑
est representation within the professional community of the ideals which 
give that community its (ideological) form. Far from being a stance taken 
at the margins or the periphery …, anti ‑professionalism is the very center 
of the professional ethos, constituting by the very rigour of its opposition 
the true form of that which it opposes. Professionalism cannot do without 
anti ‑professionalism: it is the chief support and maintenance of the profes‑
sional ideology; its presence is a continual assertion and sign of the purity 
of the profession’s intentions.53
Fish concludes that anti ‑professionalism is professionalism itself in its purest form. 
Consequently, anti ‑professionalism cannot be a viable alternative to professional‑
ism because it will never reach a vantage point from which to adopt a detached 
and metaprofessional stance on what it purports to defy. By analogy — though it is 
an analogy which Fish does not seem to find handy in his own argument — anti‑
 ‑theoretical pronouncements which contest theory will in the long run solidify the 
enterprise itself rather than undermine its ideological foundations.
In Professional Correctness: Literary Studies and Political Change, his major 
defence of the profession of literary criticism, Fish waxes conservative and resorts 
to arguments which are very difficult to square with his anti ‑foundationalism. He 
registers a threat to the identity of literary criticism, and, accordingly, he tries to 
isolate what should be preserved and protected against external pressures. First of 
all, Fish inveighs against the latest vogues in literary studies — interdisciplinarity 
and the New Historicism — for their ambition to connect up with what is going on 
52 To do him justice, it must be ackowledged that in 2001 he finally published, with Harvard 
University Press, his monumental study of Milton entitled How Milton Works.
53 Stanley Fish, “Anti ‑Professionalism,” in: Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally, 244—245.
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in the political arena.54 It is his conviction that literary criticism cannot, and should 
not, try to effect radical political changes because it is “characterized by a limited 
set of concerns and if those concerns are replaced by some others and the questions 
internal to literary study — questions like ‘What does this poem mean?’ — are let 
go in favour of other, supposedly larger, questions, one would still be doing some‑
thing, but it would not be literary criticism.”55 It is his conviction that interdisci‑
plinary approaches as well as historicist ones are informed by a misguided urge to 
find a political justification for doing literary criticism. This justification, which is 
felt to be the profession’s raison d’être these days, is supposed to give those perspec‑
tives a moral sanction to continue what they are doing.
By far the most controversial claim that Fish makes in Professional Correctness 
is that literary criticism does not need a moral sanction at all because “[l]iterary 
interpretation, like virtue, is its own reward.”56 This is how he explains the isola‑
tionist implications of his conception of the discipline: its only rationale lies in 
the pleasure and satisfaction it affords to its practitioners. Incredible as it sounds 
from a leading anti ‑foundationalist of the day, his advice to literary critics is that 
they confine themselves to interpreting the literary work itself (to ‘getting it right’) 
rather than use it as part of an extra ‑literary strategy. According to Fish, interpre‑
tive acts should have as their immediate aim “the telling of the truth about some 
text or group of texts.”57 It is a point that Fish makes repeatedly, and ocassionally 
it takes the form of a plainly anti ‑pragmatic desideratum: “[y]ou can choose to do 
interpretive work, to try and get at the truth about texts or events or cultures …, or 
you can choose to do political work; but you can’t do interpretive work … with the 
intention of doing political work because once you decide to do political work — 
that is, have before you from the start a particular political purpose you are trying 
to effect — you will be responsive and responsible to criteria that do not respect or 
even recognize the criteria of the academy.”58 Thus the choice is basically between 
being true to your profession’s imperatives by focusing on the exploration of what 
the text really means (of its truth) and using it (indeed, abusing it from the point of 
view of professional purity) for extra ‑literary purposes.
I see two practical problems with this idyllic picture of the discipline and its 
practitioners. First of all, when Fish insists on aiming our interpretations at the 
telling of the truth about a text, he seems to be regressing to an outmoded version 
of essentialism which takes the existence of each text’s truth as independent of 
our interpretive acts and unaffected by the historical, cultural and political situ‑
atedness of the reader. On the contrary, it is only in the light of some extratextual 
54 See Stanley Fish, Professional Correctness: Literary Studies and Political Change (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1999), 47—48 and 51—52.
55 Fish, Professional Correctness, 42.
56 Fish, Professional Correctness, 110.
57 Fish, Professional Correctness, 94.
58 Fish, Professional Correctness, 133.
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concerns and convictions that we can interpret anything at all; pure interpretation 
for its own sake is a fiction made up by those who want to disguise their actual 
ideological agendas. Secondly, Fish’s distinction between professional interpreta‑
tion and the use one makes of a text for political purposes59 runs against the grain 
of one of the tersest definitions of the pragmatist position on the issue offered by 
Richard Rorty who claims that “all anybody ever does with anything is use it.”60 
Consequently, no interpretation is free of some extra ‑literary assumptions and 
pre ‑determined intentions as to its purpose and outcome. We never interpret just 
to interpret, out of pure respect for the object of our interpretation. Even if the 
sole purpose of our interpretation is the satisfaction that reading can afford us, it 
should not be mistaken for the disinterested uncovering of a text’s essence or its 
immanent truth.
Finally, let us go back to the issue of justification which, rather than constitute 
a moral sanction to practise Literary Studies, should further pragmatist goals and 
projects. It is my conviction that, if doing literary criticism is to be a purposeful 
and meaningful activity, it must be tied up with the didactic responsibilities of the 
academy. The idea of the ‘ivory tower’ — synonymous with such ‘academic virtues’ 
as disinterestedness and impracticality — will never chime in with the pragmatist 
stance on the value of knowledge. John Dewey, a paradigmatic pragmatist in this 
respect, describes his theory of the method of knowing in the following words: “Its 
essential feature is to maintain the continuity of knowing with an activity which 
purposely modifies the environment. … Only that which has been organized into 
our disposition so as to enable us to adapt the environment to our needs and to 
adapt our aims and desires to the situation in which we live is really knowledge.”61 
The corollary of that is that Literary Studies should never be merely “an object of 
aesthetic contemplation,”62 as Dewey has it. It is in the nature of the academic insti‑
tution that literary scholars should use their knowledge and skills to affect their 
immediate environment (i.e. their colleagues and students) with the intention (even 
if unacknowledged) of exerting some influence on the external world. What this 
necessitates is a close relationship between research and teaching; we should revive 
the 19th ‑century model of education which saw literary scholarship not as an end 
in itself but as a means of acquiring knowledge to be subsequently transmitted to 
students.63 At the same time let us bear in mind that such a transmission, despite 
its limited and unostentatious modus operandi, is in fact a political process which 
59 A similar distinction is made by Umberto Eco in his essay “Overinterpreting Texts,” in: 
Stefan Collini, ed., Interpretation and Overintepretation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992), 45—66.
60 Richard Rorty, “The Pragmatist’s Progress,” in: Stefan Collini, ed., Interpretation and Over‑
intepretation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 93.
61 Dewey, “Theories of Knowledge,” 216—217.
62 Dewey, “Theories of Knowledge,” 214.
63 See Bruce E. Fleming, “What Is the Value of Literary Studies?” New Literary History 31 
(2000), 469.
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has some far ‑reaching effect on the views and personalities of those who lend us 
their ears.
The notion of knowledge, though central to both sides of the academic coin (i.e. 
scholarship and teaching), does not necessarily have to be taken too seriously. Once 
again, if we see knowledge as an instrument — and that is how the New Pragmatists 
want to see Literary Studies — what matters is that it should serve our purposes. 
Our interpretations and the ways we talk about them, rather than aspire to scien‑
tific objectivity at all costs, should be persuasive and interesting. It is the degree of 
their influence on how our readers/listeners will see the texts that we want to bring 
to their attention that constitutes the ultimate test of our scholarly expertise. Of 
course, we may keep on pretending that there is some intrinsic value and meaning 
to our readings, that our canons are more than arbitrary, and that, at the end of the 
day, the most conscientious scholars will be able to spot the light of some profound 
truth about literature and the world at large. But there is no point in justifying that 
by some transcendental injunction enjoined upon each interpreter by the condi‑
tions of the possibility of all texts or by our mission and professional responsibili‑
ties that we bear to society. No matter whether we admit that to ourselves or try to 
come up with some high ‑faluting rationale for engaging in Literary Studies, we will 
do so in order to proselytise new converts to our point of view and thus make our 
own camp stronger and more influential (read: solidify our own professional posi‑
tion). The New Pragmatist paradigm, in turn, may prove to be a sober corrective 
to the hypocrisy of all those who persistently deny that that is the ultimate reason 
for their (either theoretical or practical) interpretive activity.
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